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Background: Travel from countries where viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHF) are endemic has increased significantly
over the past decades. In several reported VHF events on airplanes, passenger trace back was initiated but the scale
of the trace back differed considerably. The absence of guidance documents to help the decision on necessity and
scale of the trace back contributed to this variation.
This article outlines the recommendations of an expert panel on Lassa fever, Ebola and Marburg haemorrhagic
fever to the wider scientific community in order to advise the relevant stakeholders in the decision and scale of a
possible passenger trace back.
Method: The evidence was collected through review of published literature and through the views of an expert
panel. The guidance was agreed by consensus.
Results: Only a few events of VHF cases during air travel are reported in literature, with no documented infection
in followed up contacts, so that no evidence of transmission of VHF during air travel exists to date. Based on this
and the expert opinion, it was recommended that passenger trace back was undertaken only if: the index case had
symptoms during the flight; the flight was within 21 days after detection of the event; and for Lassa fever if
exposure of body fluid has been reported. The trace back should only be done after confirmation of the index case.
Passengers and crew with direct contact, seat neighbours (+/− 1 seat), crew and cleaning personal of the section of
the index case should be included in the trace back.
Conclusion: No evidence has been found for the transmission of VHF in airplanes. This information should be
taken into account, when a trace back decision has to be taken, because such a measure produces an enormous
work load. The procedure suggested by the expert group can guide decisions made in future events, where a
patient with suspected VHF infection travelled on a plane. However, the actual decision on start and scale of a trace
back always lies in the hands of the responsible people taking all relevant information into account.
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In recent years, with increasing numbers of passengers
travelling internationally by air the potential risk of
introduction and spread of rare infectious diseases by
travellers has increased.
In 2010, 5.04 billion passengers arrived and departed
from 1318 airports worldwide, nearly half of them on
international flights [1], and travel to and from Africa al-
most doubled between 1995 and 2005 [2]. The number
of tourists reaching more remote areas and risking ex-
posure to viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) viruses has
also increased. This has contributed to an increase of
reported events in which a passenger with a VHF tra-
velled on board an aircraft. Although the air transporta-
tion of a passenger suffering from a VHF is still rare, and
has led to reported secondary transmission in the coun-
try of destination only once [3], the severe potential out-
come of the disease and the public perception of its
infectiousness result sometimes in high media attention.
Often this public pressure influences the decision on
public health measures, such as passenger trace back,
more than the existing evidence. In several reported
VHF events on airplanes, passenger trace back was
initiated [4] but the scale of the trace back response dif-
fered considerably. Absence of guidance documents to
help the decision on necessity and scale of the trace back
may well have contributed to this variation.
In order to assist national public health authorities in
European Union (EU) Member States to evaluate the
risks related to the transmission of a VHF on board of
aircrafts and to help in the decision on the most appro-
priate, operationally possible, public health measures for
containment, the European Centre for Disease Preven-
tion and Control (ECDC) initiated in 2007 the project
“Risk assessment guidance for infectious diseases trans-
mitted on aircraft” (RAGIDA) [5].
The RAGIDA project consisted of two parts I) a system-
atic review of the literature of documented events of
infectious disease transmission on aircrafts, guidance
documents and expert interviews assessing case-based in-
formation on events [6], and II) a series of disease-specific
guidance documents produced by external expert panels
based on the literature review and their personal expertise
[7]. This article reports the recommendations of the ex-
pert panel on the VHFs – Lassa fever, Ebola and Marburg
haemorrhagic fever that are included in the ECDC gui-
dance document [7]. It aims to reach and advise the wider
scientific and public health community and other relevant
stakeholders on the necessity to implement a passenger
trace back and the scale of the response.
Methods
The second part of the RAGIDA project initiated
the production of a series of operational guidancedocuments for assisting in the evaluation of risk for
transmission of diseases. As for all other disease groups
within RAGIDA, a small, multidisciplinary expert group
meeting was held in June 2010 to consider Lassa fever,
Ebola and Marburg haemorrhagic fever. These particu-
lar VHFs had been reported in context of past passen-
ger trace back activities. The participants were selected
to include: representatives of national public health au-
thorities with experience in the investigation and
follow-up of incidents involving VHFs in travellers;
European and international disease experts; representa-
tives of ECDC and of the World Health Organizations
Regional Office for Europe (WHO-EURO). All par-
ticipants completed a declaration of interest form. No
conflicts of interest were declared by any of the partici-
pants. The participants are listed in the acknowledge-
ment of this article.
The evidence collected through the review of scientif-
ically published and grey literature in part I of the
RAGIDA project, was considered by the participants [6].
In addition, evidence was provided based on expe-
riences and opinions of the expert panel. In developing
the guidance, not only the available scientific evidence
for disease transmission were taken into account, but
also wider aspects including disease severity, the poten-
tial for public health intervention and availability of
treatment. A draft approach was discussed and agreed on
at the meeting. The final guidance document of the
expert panel was agreed by consensus and validated




A detailed systematic literature review identified nine
incidents of Lassa fever cases being imported into
Europe, (including one case which was in transit in
London while travelling to the U.S.) between 2000
and 2010 [8-17].
Details about contact tracing were available for seven
of the events. Contact tracing was initiated in all seven
events because the index cases were symptomatic on-
board, and the incubation period still allowed for
preventive measures to be taken. In two events, a com-
prehensive follow up was initiated, and passengers could
be traced because their seat location in relation to the
index case’s seat was known. Contact tracing was done
by actively contacting passengers with the help of airline
manifests, 179/293 contacts were successfully traced,
and none developed the disease [6].
The literature review showed that existing evidence
suggested a low risk of transmission of Lassa fever
Gilsdorf et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:1014 Page 3 of 8
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/1014during air travel, it also suggests that the risk remains
low even if a high risk exposure occurred [9,12].
Ebola haemorrhagic fever
The literature review only found one article in the peer-
reviewed journals related to Ebola virus on a flight [18],
but this was a repatriation flight of the patient who was
already very sick. Only 4 crew members were in contact
with the patient, and neither the crew nor any of the
other 74 contacts identified and tested, showed evidence
of sero-conversion. One article was retrieved from the
grey literature that reported a patient who took a com-
mercial flight from Gabon to Johannesburg in 1996 for
hospital treatment [3]. During the flight, the diagnosis of
Ebola haemorrhagic fever (later laboratory confirmed)
was not known. He presented with fever and jaundice,
both not severe. He was only traced back after a nurse
caring for him died and Ebola haemorrhagic fever was
diagnosed. This happened sometime after the flight, so
no passenger trace back was initiated.
With this low number of events of Ebola haemorrhagic
fever on flights, other studies describing transmission
risk of Ebola haemorrhagic fever were examined to de-
scribe the likelihood of transmission. The reviewed stu-
dies show a low risk of transmission in the early phase
of symptomatic patients, even if high risk exposure oc-
curred. However, risk of transmission may increase in
later stages of the disease with increasing viral titres [19]
and increased viral shedding. In a household study, se-
condary transmission only took place if direct physical
contact occurred [20]; In an outbreak in 2000 in Uganda,
the most important risk factor was direct and repeated
contact with a sick person’s body fluids, as occurs during
the provision of care. The risk was higher when the ex-
posure took place during the late stage of the disease.
However, one case was probably infected by contact with
heavily contaminated fomites, and many persons who
had had a simple physical contact with a sick person did
not become infected. Therefore transmission through
heavily contaminated fomites is apparently possible [21].
In summary, physical contact with body fluids seems ne-
cessary for transmission, especially in the early stages of
disease (as is likely in passengers still able to travel on a
plane), while in the later stages contact with heavily con-
taminated fomites might also be a risk for transmission.
Marburg haemorrhagic fever
The literature review for Marburg haemorrhagic fever
showed few peer reviewed reports. One was an event
where a Marburg haemorrhagic fever patient travelled
on a plane to the Netherlands in July 2008 [22]. No
transmission occurred in the followed up passengers in
this event. A U.S. tourist who had visited the same bat
cave in Uganda as the Dutch case in January 2008,developed symptoms after returning to the U.S. and was
retrospectively diagnosed in January 2009, none of the
260 identified contacts developed severe febrile illness
[23].
Published information about risk of transmission is
very sparse. The WHO fact sheet on Marburg haemor-
rhagic fever states that transmission of the virus from
person to person requires extremely close contact with a
patient. Infection results from contact with blood or
other body fluids (faeces, vomitus, urine, saliva, and re-
spiratory secretions) with high virus concentration, espe-
cially when these fluids contain blood. Infection through
casual contact is thought to be exceedingly rare [24,25].
The largest Marburg haemorrhagic fever outbreak
recorded was in Angola in 2005, with 374 reported cases
(158 laboratory confirmed) and 329 deaths [26]. The dis-
ease spread particularly among people exposed to Mar-
burg virus during home care or at funerals, via contact
with body fluids of those who died from the disease. The
dangerous use of home-based injections was also identi-
fied as a major cause of the outbreak’s spread [27,28].
However, in a study in the Democratic Republic of
Congo in 1999, no antibodies were found in health care
workers despite frequent high risk procedures [25]. In
the first reported outbreak in 1967, the 32 cases reported
produced only 6 secondary infections in close family
members [29-31]. In another study only 1 of 207 close
contacts of a case patient with Marburg haemorrhagic
fever contracted the virus [32].
Guidance
Based on the literature reviews the expert group deve-
loped a trace back guidance by disease. The risk assess-
ment of possible transmission of VHF on an aircraft
should be undertaken on a case-by-case basis. This
should take into account information on the index case
status, the epidemic situation of the country where the
index case most likely acquired the infection, the pos-
sible exposure of the index case and how long the event
has been detected after the flight. When to consider a
passenger as probable case, was based on symptom de-
scription by WHO and probable exposure to a source of
the respective VHF. The decision guidance is sum-
marised by disease in Table 1.
The decisions for initiating a trace back are outlined in
the risk assessment algorithm in Figure 1.
Since direct contact is the main route of transmission
for VHF, the trace back should be mainly limited to pas-
sengers and crew who were close to the index case. The
following should be included in the trace back:
 Passengers and crew with reported direct contact
Co-travellers and crew members who had reported
direct body contact to the index case should be
Table 1 Risk assessment for trace back of patients with a Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (Lassa fever, Marburg, or Ebola
haemorrhagic fever), who travelled on an airplane
Lassa Ebola Marburg
Index case Probable or laboratory confirmed cases can be considered for trace back
A patient could be considered
as a probable case of Lassa
A patient could be considered as a
probable case of Ebola
A patient could be considered as a
probable case of Marburg
1. Who has symptoms compatible
with Lassa (malaise, fever, headache,
sore throat, cough, nausea, vomiting,
diarrhoea, myalgia, chest pain, hearing
loss [33]) AND
1. Who has symptoms compatible with
Ebola (sudden onset of fever, intense
weakness, muscle pain, headache, sore
throat, vomiting, diarrhoea, rash,
impaired kidney and liver function,
internal and external bleeding [34] AND
1. Who has symptoms compatible
with Marburg (abrupt onset, severe
headache, severe malaise, muscle aches
and pains, high fever, severe watery
diarrhoea, abdominal pain and
cramping, nausea, vomiting [24]) AND
2. Who had within 21 days of
symptom onset
2. Who had within 21 days of
symptom onset
2. Who had within 21 days of
symptom onset
a) Risk exposure to rats or their
droppings in rural areas in
West Africa [35] OR
a) Risk exposure in Sub-Saharan Africa
(medical treatment, contact to body
fluids of ill persons, contact with
primates or bats in areas with
suspected or known Ebola activity
[36]) OR
a) Risk exposure in Sub-Saharan Africa
(medical treatment, contact with body
fluids of ill persons, contact with
primates or bats. in areas with
suspected or known Marburg activity
[36]) OR
b) Contact to a case of Lassa (e.g.
health care worker, care giver, etc.)
b) Contact with a case of Ebola. b) Contact with a case of Marburg.
WHO recommends a case definition for surveillance standards that could be also helpful for contact tracing [37].
Epidemic situation Travel to West Africa Travel to Sub-Saharan Africa
Certain West African countries are
considered endemic areas for
transmission of Lassa fever [35].
However, non-endemic countries
may also be taken into consideration
if the passenger has particular risk
exposures. Although the epidemiology
remains to be determined, a new
Arenavirus called Lujo, which is similar
to Lassa virus, has been identified in
case from Zambia with secondary
transmission in South Africa [38].
Certain Sub-Saharan African countries
are considered as risk areas for
transmission [36]. However not only
those African countries where already
cases have been reported should be
taken into consideration, as the index
patient could be the first case to
indicate infection in a country.
Certain Sub-Saharan African countries
are considered as risk areas for
transmission [36]. However not only
those African countries where already
cases have been reported should be
taken into consideration, as the index
patient could be the first case to
indicate infection in a country.
Risk exposure: The reservoir of Lassa
virus is a rodent host M.natalensis,
in which it is persistent and mostly
silent. [39] Outbreaks have also been
reported in hospital settings [40].
Risk exposure: Evidence indicates to
bats as one of the reservoir of Ebola
[41]. On the African continent, Ebola
infections of human cases have been
linked to direct contact with gorillas,
chimpanzees, monkeys, forest antelope
and porcupines found dead in the
rainforest. [34,42,43]. Human-to-Human
transmission has taken place during
medical treatment, through direct
contact with body fluids of ill or dead
persons. Outbreaks have also been
reported in hospital settings. This
should be taken into consideration
when assessing the risk exposure
of a probable case.
Risk exposure: Evidence indicates to
bats as one of the reservoir of Marburg
[44,45]. Human-to-Human transmission
route is through direct contact with
blood or other infected body fluids.
Outbreaks have also been reported in
hospital settings. This should be taken
into consideration when assessing the
risk exposure to a probable case.
Effective Exposure Direct contact to body fluids Direct contact with case even if exposure to body fluids was not reported
Contact tracing of a Lassa case, should
only be considered if direct contact to
body fluids such as blood, urine, faeces
or vomit had taken place during the
flight. Unless such an incident took
place, the likelihood of a transmission
is considered negligible.
Human-to-human transmission of Ebola
virus occurs through direct contact with
infectious body fluids. However, Ebola
virus has also been detected in sweat
[46], and although the risk is very low,
passengers who may have had direct
contact with the case should be
contacted and followed-up, even if
exposure to body fluids was not
reported.
Human-to-human transmission of
Marburg virus occurs through direct
contact with infected body fluids.
As the transmission of Marburg virus
through sweat cannot be excluded, and
although the risk is very low, passengers
who may have had direct contact with
the case should be contacted and
followed-up, even if exposure to body
fluids was not reported.
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Table 1 Risk assessment for trace back of patients with a Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (Lassa fever, Marburg, or Ebola
haemorrhagic fever), who travelled on an airplane (Continued)
Timing of flight Detection of the event within 21 days after the flight
The incubation period of Lassa is
usually seven to 12 days but may range
between three and 21 days [32,47-49].
In order to find potential cases, tracing
passengers should only be considered if
the flight took place within the previous
21 days.
The incubation period of Ebola usually
ranges between two and 21 days [50].
Thus in order to find potential cases,
tracing passengers should only be
considered if the flight happened
within the previous 21 days.
Incubation period for Marburg ranges
between 2 and 14 days [51]. In order to
find potential cases within the possible
longest incubation period, tracing
passengers should only be considered,
if the flight happened within the
previous 21 days. To have a common
approach with the other VHF it was
decided to use for Marburg also the
21 days period.
After this time period a message to
raise awareness among doctors and
public health professionals should
be considered.
After this time period, a message to
raise awareness among doctors and
public health professionals could
be considered.
After this time period a message to
raise awareness among doctors and
public health professionals could
be considered.
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significant events on the flight should be obtained
from the airline
 Passengers +/−1 seat
As direct contact is the main route of transmission
for the three VHFs, only the passengers who sat in
direct proximity to the index passenger should be
included into the trace back. That means only
passengers, who sat one seat in all four directions
from the index case in all directions should be
traced backed. If the index case sat on an aisle seat,
also the passengers sitting one seat across the aisle
should be contacted.
 Crew members of plane section
Crew members who served in the section of the
index case should be included in the trace back, as
well as any other crew members who had direct
with the patient e.g. they had assisted him or her.
 Cleaning staff of plane section
The cleaning staff who were responsible for cleaning
the section and seat where the index case sat should
be traced back, and assessed as to whether effective
personal protective equipment had been used.
Discussion
The usual methodology for producing guidance is
based on the assessment of scientific evidence mainly
from literature reviews and expert opinion. However,
because of the lack of relevant publications regarding a
patient with a VHF on flight, the expert opinion ap-
proach was chosen. The group participants represented
a wide range of expertise and experience. Beside the
risk of transmission, other facts have to be considered.
Even though there is no specific treatment available
for Marburg and Ebola infections, early supportive care
should improve the outcome of cases. Also, reason of
starting contact tracing should be to raise awareness
and prevent onward transmission. Specific treatment isavailable for Lassa virus infection, but this is most ef-
fective if initiated early in the disease, so initiation of
antiviral treatment is an additional reason to consider
a trace back [52].
Patients with more severe symptoms are more infec-
tious, but as it is difficult to judge when the symptoms
indicate infectiousness, severity was not considered as
a criterion to decide for trace back but only the pre-
sence of any symptoms compatible with VHF during
the flight.
Cases of Lassa fever, Ebola or Marburg haemorrhagic
fever were not considered to be infectious before they
developed symptoms [53]. Therefore a trace back should
only be initiated, if the index patient was symptomatic
on board. These would include non-specific symptoms,
as these may occur in the early stages of infection.
The main route of transmission for a VHF infection is
by direct contact with infectious body fluids. The trans-
mission of a VHF through aerosol spread was consid-
ered as negligible. In the absence of specific incidents
involving body fluids, the use of a toilet by the index
case is not considered as a risk factor and therefore
would not be considered in the contact tracing. Since
direct contact is necessary for the transmission of a
VHF, the duration of flight is not taken into consider-
ation for the decision to start a trace back. We recom-
mend trace back to be initiated following laboratory
confirmation of the diagnosis. However, the airline
should be contacted to enquire whether crew members
remembered or recorded any incidents on board which
might have resulted in potential exposures to crew or
passengers and the availability of the passenger manifest
while awaiting the laboratory result. This will facilitate
prompt actions should a VHF be confirmed. If a diagno-
sis cannot be laboratory confirmed in a timely manner,
contact tracing should be considered if evidence















Report of an event
Is the case probable or 
confirmed?
Did the case 
have symptoms 
during flight?
Was the case detected
within 21 days after 
flight?
Has there been
exposure to body 






Start collecting passenger 
information and ask for 
specific incidents during the 
flight
Contact tracing: 
• Passenger and crew with known direct contact to the index
• Passengers +/- 1 seat
• Cabin crew of plane section of index case
• Cleaning crew of plane section of index case
Confirmed
Figure 1 Risk assessment algorithm: Viral Haemorrhagic Fever (Lassa fever, Marburg or Ebola haemorrhagic fever). * If the diagnosis
cannot be laboratory confirmed (e.g. if clinical samples are unavailable), contact tracing should be considered if the clinical and epidemiological
picture is strongly suggestive of a VHF as the likely diagnosis.
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Only few events of VHF cases during air travel have
been reported in literature, with no documented trans-
mission in contacts who were followed up. Hence, evi-
dence for transmission is lacking. Therefore, the expert
group considered the risk of transmission of a VHF
from an infected patient during a flight to be very low.
This information should be taken into account when a
trace back decision has to be taken, because such a
measure produces a significant workload for many
people involved. The procedure suggested by the ex-
pert group will guide decision takers in future events
where a patient with a suspected VHF infectiontravelled on a plane. However, the actual decision on
start and scale of a trace back always lies in the hands
of the responsible people taking all relevant informa-
tion into account.
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